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ALL BARK AND NO BITE: HOW
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING CAN SOLVE
CHINA’S POOR ENFORCEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION

S

tarting in the late 1970s, China began a dramatic transformation of its labor system from one of guaranteed employment to one based on contract labor.1 In response to this
ongoing process of systematic change and the emergence of an
enormous population of new laborers,2 China has found itself in
the challenging position of structuring an employment system
that spurs economic growth without sacrificing employee rights
and benefits. To address this issue, China has implemented a
wave of employment regulations aimed at guaranteeing certain
basic rights for workers. Starting with the Labor Law of 1995,3
the Labor Contract Law of 2008 4 (“LCL”), the 2013 Amendments to the Labor Contract Law,5 and the proposed Draft Labor Dispatch Regulations, 6 China has created a substantial

1. Susan Leung, China’s Labor Contract System from Planned to Market
Economy, 3 J. L. ETHICS & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1-2 (2012).
2. LOREN BRANDT & THOMAS G. RAWSKI, CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION 1 (2008).
3. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa (中华人民共和国劳动法)
[Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), translation
available at http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=56&aid=31.
4. Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), translation available at
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/labor/laborcontract-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html [hereinafter Labor Contract Law].
5. See Jeanette Yu, Newly Amended PRC Labor Contract Law Imposing
Stricter Control Over the Use of Seconded Employees, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 14,
2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eec02e59-c329-4c77aafb-4b4c19324c95.
6. See Jeffrey Wilson, Comments on Draft Labor Dispatch Regulations
Due by September 7, INT’L LAB. & EMP’T L. COMM. NEWSL., Aug. 2013, available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/int_newslet
ter/2013/aug2013/china.html.
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foundation of mandated employment rights for Chinese workers.7
However, while the numerous adjustments to the labor contract system have dramatically increased employee rights, they
have failed at enforcing such rights and ensuring these workers
access to legal remedy. Due to both a lack of knowledge8 and
insufficient funds to spend on legal counsel, Chinese workers
are often unaware or unable to access their statutory rights.9
Therefore, a more prudent approach to the problems of Chinese
workers would be to create programs to publicize employee
rights and pass legislation that incentivizes Chinese attorneys
to take LCL violation cases at little or no cost to the workers.
To achieve these goals and provide adequate legal remedy to
the Chinese workforce, China should implement both a modified attorney fee-shifting program that emphasizes merit-based
awards as well as a poster notification system to increase
knowledge of employment rights. The combination of these minor adjustments to China’s labor contract system will increase
employee knowledge of their statutory rights and create a powerful financial motivation for Chinese lawyers to represent employee plaintiffs.
This Note will address the development of the labor contract
system in China as it transformed from a plan-based system to
one built around labor contracts and will advocate for legislative changes to better ensure workers’ access to their statutory
rights. Part I will address the history of the labor contract system as well as the current problems faced by many Chinese laborers. Part II will provide background on the concept of attorney fee shifting, its use in American Civil Rights cases, and
some of the problems the system has created for municipalities.
Finally, Part III will suggest a modified version of attorney fee
shifting and a poster notification system for use in China,

7. See Vikas Bajaj, Chinese Workers’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES TAKING NOTE
(Feb.
8,
2013,
2:19
PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/chinese-workers-rights.
8. See Aaron Halegua, Note, Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes
of China’s Migrant Workers, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 254, 256 (2008)
9. See Xingni Liang, Attorney Fee-Shifting and Labor Rights in China,
IS
NOT
A
COMMODITY
(Dec.
4,
2009),
LABOR
http://laborrightsblog.typepad.com/international_labor_right/2009/12/attorne
y-fee-shifting-and-labor-rights-in-china.html.
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which will provide laborers with knowledge and access to the
employment rights elicited in the Labor Contract Law as well
as avoid some of the major burdens attorney fee shifting has
created in the United States.
I. BACKGROUND
a. The Iron Rice Bowl: China’s Plan-Based Economic Model
In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) inherited a nation decimated by years of war and civil strife.10
The repercussions of the Second Sino-Japanese War,11 followed
by the Chinese Civil War, had left China in a dire economic
state and provided the newly established communist government with substantial obstacles.12 As the PRC came into power,
over 4.7 million people in urban areas were unemployed.13 Furthermore, inflation resulting from the Chinese government’s
overproduction of currency led to heightened prices and threw
many rural families into severe poverty.14
In an attempt to maintain social stability and build a successful economic system out of rubble, the PRC followed the footsteps of the Soviet Union and implemented a “plan-based” economic system. 15 Through this system, the PRC combined expansive state ownership of industry with central control over
prices and production.16 The purpose of such a centralized plan
10. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2; see also BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2,
at 4.
BRITANNICA,
11. Sino-Japanese
War,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/546188/Sino-Japanese-War (last
visited Mar. 31, 2014).
12. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4.
13. Leung, supra note 1, at 2.
14. Richard Ebeling, The Great Chinese Inflation, FREEMAN, Dec. 2004, at
2, 3. China experienced severe inflation throughout the 1940s after China
“took the country off the silver standard, made its bank notes legal tender,
and placed the country on a fiat currency with government in full control of
the quantity of money.” Id.
15. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4.
16. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4; see also Yiwen Fei, The Institutional Change in China after its Reform in 1979: An Institutional Analysis
with a Focus on Mergers and Acquisitions (Nov. 18, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis,
Erasmus
University
Rotterdam),
available
at
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/6854/. China’s centrally-planned economy determined
prices by “administrative rather than market mechanisms and [allocated
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was to “raise domestic saving . . . by extracting resources from
the rural sector, and . . . channel[ing] these funds toward industrial growth.” 17 However, to achieve such a goal, China
needed to increase employment in both urban and rural areas
of the country.18 To this end, the PRC began a program of “government . . . job assignment through labor and education bureaus” in order to fill vacancies in state-owned enterprises and
curb the massive unemployment rates throughout the urban
sector.19
This system of employment soon became known as the “iron
rice bowl,” 20 by which the government provided life-long employment and benefits for those assigned state-run positions.21
Because these state-run positions remained solely in urban areas and were restricted to urban residents, 22 the PRC subsequently limited urban migration from rural areas of China
through the Household Registration Regulations of 1958.23
The PRC used these laws to divide the population of China
into two groups, urban and rural, based on a person’s
hometown at the time of the law’s implementation.24 Mobility
between the two groups was highly uncommon and extremely

resources] by central planners rather than by forces of supply and demand.”
Id. at 29. Furthermore, China emphasized state industry development and
focused on the expansion of heavy industry at the sacrifice of agricultural
development. See id.
17. BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 4.
18. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2.
19. See id.
20. See Jia Ching Chen, From the Iron Rice Bowl to the Steel Cafeteria
Tray, in FACTORY TOWNS IN SOUTH CHINA 45 (Stefan Al ed., 2012), available at
http://www.academia.edu/1897603/_From_the_Iron_Rice_Bowl_to_the_Steel_
Cafeteria_Tray_in_Factory_Towns_in_South_China_edited_by_S._Al_2012_Hong_K
ong_Hong_Kong_University_Press.
21. See id.; Fei, supra note 16. Fear that private organizations would be
unwilling to reinvest profits in future government programs eventually led to
the nationalization of private banking and industrial enterprises. With these
enormous enterprises under state control and a government policy emphasizing industrial development, the number of “government jobs” expanded greatly. Id.
22. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2.
23. Id.; Kam Wing Chan, Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a Debate, 36 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 357, 357-58 (2010).
24. Leung, supra note 1, at 2.
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difficult.25 Because only urban residents were entitled to government job assignment and its life-long employment guarantee,26 the PRC used the housing registration system to avoid a
complete abandonment of the rural sector.27
The results of the PRC’s plan-based economic system were
dramatic in the sectors affected28 but, overall, failed to utilize
the true potential of the Chinese workforce.29 The PRC’s economic model achieved moderate progress in the creation of
human capital30 and the introduction of new industries.31 Specifically, mortality among both children and new mothers declined, school attendance and academic achievement of students increased, and new vehicle manufacturers and power
plant industries began to develop. 32 However, these achievements were overshadowed by the tremendous failure to properly utilize China’s massive working class.33 A prime example of
the inefficiency34 and redundancy that plagued the PRC’s system was the man-made famine of 1959, which killed over thirty
million Chinese people. 35 Furthermore, the industries devel25. Chan, supra note 23, at 358 (“Hukou conversion, referring to change
from the rural to the urban category, was tightly controlled and permitted
only under very limited conditions, usually when needed for the state’s industrialization objectives.”).
26. Leung, supra note 1, at 2.
27. See id.; Chan, supra note 23, at 358 (arguing that the registration system was intended to prevent “‘undesirable’ rural-to-urban migratory flows”).
28. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5.
29. See Fei, supra note 16, at 33.
30. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5.
31. See Fei, supra note 16, at 25.
32. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5.
33. See id. at 5-6.
34. See Fei, supra note 16, at 38-39. The Planned Economic System suffered primarily from two forms of inefficiency: allocative inefficiency and xinefficiency. First, “because prices were determined in an administrative way
instead of by the forces of supply and demand,” consumer preferences had no
influence on production. Id. at 38. Second, with infinite funds generated by
the state, and specific production requirements, State-Owned Enterprises
(“SOEs”) had no fear of suffering a loss and would receive no reward for making a profit. Therefore, the SOEs held no incentive to maintain an efficient
business structure. Id.
35. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 5; see Vaclav Smil, China’s
Great Famine: 40 Years Later, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 1619 (1999), available at
http://www.bmj.com/content/319/7225/1619 (identifying one of the key origins
of the famine as Mao Zedong’s decision to focus state-run business efforts
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oped under the system were plagued with overemployment,
lack of innovation, and low labor morale.36 The PRC system’s
deficiencies were exacerbated by the PRC’s almost isolationist
approach to the world economy,37 which removed Chinese firms
from the motivation of international competition and left them
with the excessive costs of inefficient labor.38 The PRC’s economic plan had faltered and left the Chinese people, once
again, in need of change.
b. Introduction of the Labor Contract System: The 1995 Labor
Law
After the death of the first Chairman of the PRC, Mao
Zedong, in 1976,39 it became widely accepted that a systematic
change of China’s economy was necessary.40 In an attempt to
“restore the link between effort and reward” and jumpstart the
stagnant and unmotivated Chinese workforce, China began to
experiment with a labor contract system for small sectors of
state-run enterprises and at the same time increased the nation’s presence within the international market.41 Beginning in
1978, labor contracts “were first tried out on joint ventures in
Shenzhen and were given statutory recognition by the Provi-

heavily in steel production instead of food production). The “Great Leap Forward,” Mao Zedong’s economic model to quickly establish China as an industrialized and internationally competitive state, mobilized Chinese workers
around the primary goal of industrialization leading to severe neglect of Chinese agriculture and the food supply. William Harms, China’s Great Leap
CHI.
CHRON.
(Mar.
14,
1996),
Forward,
UNIV.
http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/960314/china.shtml. Many Chinese peasants
were pressured to build “backyard furnaces for iron and steel” and were often
recruited away from their farms to work on government building projects. Id.
This excessive emphasis on industrialization continued to the point where
grain harvests were left in the fields to rot and millions of people began to die
of starvation. Id.
36. See Leung, supra note 1, at 2; see BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at
5-6.
37. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 6, 12.
38. See id. at 6.
39. China Celebrates 120 Years Since Mao Zedong’s Birth, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Dec. 26, 2013), http://dw.de/p/1Ah3S.
40. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 8.
41. Id. at 9, 11.
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sions for Labor Management in Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures of
1980.”42
The success of these labor contract programs and the expansion into the international economy led to further implementation throughout the coastal regions of China43 and eventually a
national presence in the Labor Law of 1995. The Labor Law of
1995 was used to nationalize the labor contract approach and
end the lingering socialist distinction between state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and foreign-invested enterprises (“FIEs”).44
The Labor Law of 1995 implemented contract law principles
to all SOEs and FIEs demanding that all employers form labor
contracts with their employees that explicitly spell out terms
and conditions for employment and termination.45 The Labor
Law of 1995 was an innovative attempt to both motivate the
Chinese workforce and guarantee certain employee rights. 46
The law emphasized new protections prohibiting discrimination and child labor, and guaranteed equal pay for equal
work.47 Additionally, labor contracts were required to contain
descriptions of work duties, duration of employment, and
grounds for termination. 48 The Labor Law of 1995 achieved
great progress in improving employment mobility, which greatly decreased the redundant and inefficient use of human capital. 49 Furthermore, through defining rights and obligations
within the employee-employer relationship, the Labor Law of
1995 succeeded in pinning down these responsibilities and sta42. Leung, supra note 1, at 2. Early labor contract requirements can be
found in the Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979 and the Cooperative Joint
Venture Law of 1988, which held identical requirements that “the employment, dismissal, remuneration, welfare, labor protection and labor insurance
of the staff members and workers of an equity joint venture shall be specified
in contracts.” Id. at 3.
43. See id. at 2-3.
44. See id. at 3. Prior to the Labor Law, SOEs, as distinct from foreigninvested enterprises (“FIEs”), retained much of the socialist ideology concerning lifetime job security, benefits, and assigned job placement. Even as narrower legislation in 1986 attempted to provide greater autonomy to SOE employees, as of 1993, only a quarter of all SOE employees held labor contracts.
Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 3-4.
47. Id. at 6.
48. See id. at 3.
49. Id. at 2-4.
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bilizing a chaotic system where employment conditions were
often arbitrary.50
Despite the progressive steps the Chinese government took
through implementing the Labor Law of 1995, the resulting
privatization of many previously state-owned businesses and
the abandonment of the job assignment programs led to a high
unemployment rate, particularly among migrant workers.51 By
2006, over 160 million workers had flooded from rural to urban
areas in search of work, but without urban residential status,
these workers were often treated as second-class citizens and
discriminated against by employers.52 In the same year, studies
conducted by the Economic Intelligence Unit found that over
70% of migrant workers were employed unlawfully without
contracts.53 When contracts were signed, employers often utilized the availability of short-term contracts to prioritize enterprise flexibility over the development of their employees.54 Employers began hiring employees for numerous short-term contracts in order to avoid labor costs associated with long-term
employment. 55 Despite the government’s intention to bring
about stable, long-term contract positions, many employers
provided contracts lasting for less than two years.56 In order to
adjust the Labor Law of 1995 to better deal with the modern
issues facing Chinese employees, particularly migrant workers
and fixed-employment contract employees, China enacted the
Labor Contract Law of 2008.57
c. The Labor Contract Law of 2008
The Labor Contract Law of 2008 reiterated that all working
relationships required written contracts.58 The LCL heightened
employment costs and increased penalties for employers that
were caught hiring employees without written contracts. 59
50. Id. at 3-5.
51. See id. at 7.
52. Id.
53. ANNE-MARIE KONTAKOS, THE EFFECT OF THE LABOR CONTRACT LAW
HR IN CHINA 33, 35 (2007).
54. See Leung, supra note 1, at 6.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 8.
58. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 10.
59. See id.

ON
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Most notably, if an employer delayed writing a new employee’s
contract for too long, the LCL mandated that this employee
would automatically receive an open-ended contract.60
Similar to the Labor Law of 1995, the LCL mandated that all
employees be classified as either fixed-term or open-ended contract employees, but the LCL went a step further and contained new provisions to curb improper reliance on short-term
contracts. Article 14 of the LCL specified the situations in
which a fixed or short-term contract employee could automatically obtain an open-ended contract.61 This substantial extension of the labor contract regulations was meant to limit the
use of fixed-term contracts and encourage the use of long-term
and open contracts.62
60. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 37.
61. Id. at 34. Article 14 of the LCL automatically transforms an employee’s
fixed-term contract into an open-ended contract when certain criteria are
met. Specifically, a fixed-term contract will become open-ended when an employee wishes to renew or adjust the terms of a contract at the end of its
term, the employer fails to request the new contract be of a fixed-term, and
any of the following requirements are met.
(1) The employee has been working for the Employer for ten (10)
consecutive
years;
(2) When the Employer first introduces the labor contract system or
the state-owned enterprise that employs him re-concludes its labor
contracts as of restructuring, the employee has been working for the
Employer for ten (10) consecutive years and is less than 10 years
away
from
his
legal
retirement
age;
or
(3) Where a labor contract was concluded as a fixed-term labor contract on two consecutive occasions and the employee, in the absence
of any of the circumstances stipulated in Article 39 and items (1) and
(2) of Article 40 of this law, renews such contract.
If an Employer fails to conclude a written labor contract with an employee within one (1) year from the date the employee commences
work, they shall be deemed to have entered into an open-ended labor
contract.
Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 14.
62. See Leung, supra note 1, at 8; Kungang Li, Practice and Problems: The
Fixed-Term Employment Contract in China, in REGULATION OF FIXED-TERM
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 127, 136 (Roger
Blanpain, Hiroya Nakakubo & Takashi Araki eds., 2010). The expansive use
of fixed-term employment in China has led to a number of labor issues for
Chinese workers. See Leung, supra note 1, at 6. First, the scarcity of employment and the abundance of human resources in China have discouraged
workers from reporting substantial employment rights violations. Li, supra,
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Additionally, the LCL clarified parts of the Labor Law of
1995 concerning termination procedures, severance, and the
use of dispatch workers.63 The LCL placed heightened regulations on how employers could terminate fixed-contract employees.64 As opposed to the unilateral “at-will” approach of the Labor Law of 1995, the LCL limited employee termination to two
situations: termination for cause and termination as part of a
“mass-layoff.”65
Furthermore, the LCL attempted to maintain some of the
benefits of the “iron rice bowl” system through the use of almost guaranteed severance. The LCL required employers to
pay severance to an employee if a fixed contract expired and
the employer failed to renew the contract, except where the
employer had offered to renew employment under equal or better terms and the employee refused.66 Further details are elicited in the LCL concerning when severance must be paid, but it
is fair to say that in almost all foreseeable termination scenarios, severance would result. 67 The amount of severance to be
paid is “set at one month’s salary for each year of employment,
up to a maximum of twelve years.”68
To ensure that employers could not circumvent the LCL by
hiring workers through a third-party employment agency in
order to avoid the use of direct employment contracts, the LCL
also included provisions concerning the use of dispatch workers, or employees hired by a dispatch agency but contracted to
at 129. Fear that their employer would not renew their employment contract
coupled with the expense of legal representation has led many workers to
simply abide pervasive employee rights abuses. Leung, supra note 1, at 6.
Second, without a promise of long-term employment, the Chinese workforce
has become increasingly mobile. Id. at 5. This enhanced mobility and high
employee transfer rate has made employers reluctant to invest in and train
their workers, limiting their employees’ professional growth. Id.
63. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53. Labor dispatch workers are temporary
staff that are hired and officially contracted by a dispatch agency. They are
then sent to various third-party “host employers” to work. Dexter Roberts,
Why China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers, BLOOBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201203-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-to-temp-workers.
64. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 35.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 39.
68. Id.
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work for a separate “host” employer.69 First, to make sure foreign companies did not rely on foreign employment agencies,
the LCL required all foreign company representatives to use
dispatch agencies in China to hire any PRC nationals. 70 Second, the LCL encouraged employers to hire employees directly
by describing dispatch employee positions as supplementary,
replacement, or temporary.71 Third, the LCL required dispatch
agencies and dispatch employees to use, at a minimum, twoyear employment agreements.72 Procedures for termination of
dispatch employees were also greatly limited,73 and should an
employee be terminated prior to the end of the employee’s contract, the dispatch agency was required to pay the employee
minimum wage for the remaining term of the contract.74
Finally, in an attempt to ease access to legal remedy, Article
30 of the LCL allowed all workers to “sue directly in court for
unpaid wages without first going through [the previously required] labor arbitration process.”75 Article 94 of the LCL also
clarified that host employers were jointly and severally liable
for violations performed by a contracting agency or dispatch
employer.76
While the Labor Contract Law of 2008 made substantial progress in terms of declaring certain contractual obligations and
employee rights, the implementation and enforcement of such
rights has not been as profound.77 Although studies on the use

69. See id. at 37.
70. Id.; BRYAN CAVE LLP, CHINA AMENDS LABOR CONTRACT LAW TO
ELIMINATE
LABOR
DISPATCH
ABUSE
1
(2013),
available
at
www.bryancave.com/bulletins/Detail.aspx?pub=4137.
71. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 66.
72. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 58.
73. See KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 35.
74. See id. at 37; Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 93.
75. Xiaoying Li, How Does China’s New Labor Contract Law Affect Floating Workers? 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19254,
2011),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/papers/How%20Does%20China%2
7s%20New%20Labour%20Contract%20Law%20Affect%20Floating%20Worke
rs%20in%20China%20_Xiaoying%20Li_.pdf.
76. Labor Contract Law, supra note 4, art. 94.
77. See JEFFREY BECKER & MANFRED ELFSTROM, THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S
LABOR
CONTRACT
LAW
ON
WORKERS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/papers/How%20Does%20China’s%
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of labor contracts after the implementation of the LCL found
an increased number of employees holding some form of a labor
contract,78 these contracts are still not as universal as the law
demands and often omit provisions required under the LCL.79
Furthermore, interviewed migrant employees have reported
that employers often utilize hiring tricks to circumvent the requirements of the LCL. 80 Specifically, employers have used
“English-language only contracts, blank or covered-over contracts,” divided contracts with half pay in each, and six-day
week assignments at 6.7 hours per day in an attempt to avoid
potential overtime, wage discrepancies, and other violations of
worker’s rights under the LCL.81 Dispatch workers have fared
even worse as their suggested “supplemental” use has become
increasingly popular. The LCL’s ambiguous language describing the use of dispatch employees and the dire worldwide economic climate during the LCL’s implementation led to excessive reliance on dispatch workers.82 Employers have cited poor
economic conditions as justification for layoffs in violation of
the LCL and have fired employees simply to rehire them under
less favorable contract provisions.83 Despite the enhanced regulations of the LCL, years after its implementation the dispatch
system has become “abnormally prosperous,” 84 and dispatch

20New%20Labour%20Contract%20Law%20Affect%20Floating%20Workers%
20in%20China%20_Xiaoying%20Li_.pdf.
78. See id. at 7; Li, supra note 75, at 12-16.
79. BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 7. Only 60% of surveyed workers had a contract at the time of their interview, and many interviewees complained that the contracts they did have lacked certain required provisions.
Id.
80. See id. at 10.
81. Id. A study conducted by China’s Ministry of Public Security reported
that in 2005 alone, approximately 87,000 public protests occurred, many of
them involving migrant workers, resulting from “unpaid wages, lost land
rights and working conditions.” KONTAKOS, supra note 53, at 34.
82. Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, JINAN
DAILY, Feb. 28, 2011, available at www.clntranslations.org/file_download/140.
83. Id.
84. Id. As of 2010, data obtained by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions showed that the number of domestic labor dispatch workers had reached
sixty million, approximately 20% of all domestic workers in China. Id.
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employees have consistently received diminished wages and
less-protected health and safety rights.85
Host employers often rely on workers not understanding the
full breadth of their statutory rights under the LCL and use
the dispatch agency as a buffer to excuse illegal actions such as
docking wages, benefits, and severance pay.86 Some employers
have even begun to exploit potential employees by charging
“security deposits” to begin work or charging fees for incidents
of company “insubordination.” 87 Additionally, China’s newfound presence within the international economy spurred a
sudden burst of foreign investment and industrial growth. 88
Tied to this foreign investment in China is the challenge of international competition, making the prospect of skirting
heightened labor costs appealing to both state- and foreign85. See Yu, supra note 5; Jennifer Cheung, Workers at State-Owned Oil
Company Step Up Demand for Equal Pay for Equal Work, CHINA LABOUR
BULL. (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/workers-state-ownedoil-company-step-demand-equal-pay-equal-work. One study of 600 auxiliary
workers at a state-owned oil company in Shaanxi, conducted during a protest,
asserted that their monthly pay was only 2000 yuan, compared with the
monthly pay of 5000 yuan for the few remaining formal employees. Id.
86. See Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, supra note 82; BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 16. Although Article 94 of
the LCL holds host employers jointly liable for the violations of the LCL
committed by contracted dispatch agencies, the true appeal for host employers lies simply in remaining one step removed from the rights employees are
guaranteed by law. See Roberts, supra note 63. Host employers are not directly responsible for paying dispatch workers’ social security installments,
workers compensation, or even severance pay. Erin Wigger & Peter Schnall,
The Role of Dispatched Labor in the Exploitation of Chinese Workers,
WORK
(Aug.
18,
2012),
UNHEALTHY
http://unhealthyworkblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-role-of-dispatched-laborin.html. Rather, to access these benefits, dispatch workers must first reach
out to the dispatch agency that hired them, with whom many have had little
or no contact with since they began their employment. CHINA LABOR WATCH,
BEYOND FOXCONN: DEPLORABLE WORKING CONDITIONS CHARACTERIZE APPLE’S
ENTIRE SUPPLY CHAIN 17 (2012). Furthermore, workers are often completely
unaware of the option of legal remedy against either the dispatch agency or
their host employer and simply accept their losses and once again begin the
search for work. Id. (“Most workers do not know where their dispatch company is located or even the company’s name. With little understanding of the
law, most workers will just think they have lost their job and will not go
through the trouble of demanding their rights.”).
87. Id.
88. See BRANDT & RAWSKI, supra note 2, at 12-13.
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owned companies. Too often these companies found one of the
primary means of cutting labor costs was the abuse of dispatch
workers, an issue China realized was in dire need of resolution.89
d. Addressing the “Dispatch” Issue: The Amended Labor Contract Law of 2013
In response to the increasing reliance on and abuse of dispatch workers, the PRC amended four sections of the 2008 LCL
with the Amended PRC Labor Contract Law of 2013 (“2013
Amendments”).90 The essence of these amendments was a push
by the Chinese government to make direct hiring the primary
means of employment in China.91 The four 2013 Amendments
came into effect on July 1, 2013, and address principle concerns
with the hope to both curtail the rampant abuse of the dispatch
system and clarify when hiring dispatch workers is appropriate.
First, the 2013 Amendments modify Article 57 of the LCL,
specifically to require labor dispatch agencies to have an “appropriate fixed place of business” and a “minimum registered
capital” of 2,000,000 RMB. 92 The basic thrust of this change
makes bringing suit against a dispatch agency easier to accomplish. With a fixed business location and substantial registered
capital, dispatch agencies will have more funds for workers to
collect should their rights be violated.93 Second, Article 63’s requirement of equal pay for equal work was enhanced to require
host companies, in addition to dispatch agencies, to implement
the same payment allocation for both dispatch and direct-hire
employees.94 Third, Article 66 was revised to state “labor dispatch employment can ‘only’ be adopted for temporary, auxilia-

89. See id. at 13; see Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to
Protect, supra note 82.
90. See Yu, supra note 5.
91. Id.
92. BRYAN CAVE LLP, supra note 70, at 2.
93. Victoria Ding & Ron Cai, Amendments to the Labor Contract Law on
Labor Dispatch Services Take Effect July 1, 2013, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE
LLP (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/Amendments-to-the-LaborContract-Law-on-Labor-Dispatch-Services-Take-Effect-July-1-2013-01-312013/.
94. BRYAN CAVE LLP, supra note 70, at 2.
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ry, or substitute positions.”95 Furthermore, the terms were defined as follows:
Temporary: positions that will exist for no more than six
months;
Auxiliary: positions that are not the core-business-related positions in the company. Most government labor officials take
the view that non-core-business-related positions comprise
cafeteria workers, security guards, cleaning staff, receptionists etc.;
Substitute: positions that must be temporarily filled when an
employee is on full-time study or long-term leave (e.g., maternity).96

Article 66 was also revised to implement a “to-be-determined”
maximum percentage of dispatch workers in relation to all
workers that could be hired by an employer.97 Finally, Article
92 was amended to require businesses caught engaging in labor dispatch services without a license to not only forfeit illegal
gains, but also to face fines of up to five times their illegal
gains.98 Article 92 also increased the fine to 10,000 RMB per
worker for labor dispatch agencies and host employers that violate the LCL and do not fix the problem within a predetermined period.99
Clearly, if properly enforced, the 2013 Amendments to the
LCL would make the use of labor dispatch workers less appealing for host employers.100 The dramatic change in required registered capital, from 500,000 RMB to 2 million RMB, will drive
many of the smaller enterprises out of business and, in turn,
drive up costs for host employers still using the dispatch system.101 Additionally, the restriction to “temporary, auxiliary, or
substitute” positions will likely prevent many of the positions

95. Id.
96. WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, AMENDMENT TO PRC LABOR CONTRACT LAW
INCLUDES SIGNIFICANT CHANGES REGARDING DISPATCH ARRANGEMENTS (2013),
available at http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/1/4/v2/1416.pdf.
97. See BRYAN CAVE LLP, supra note 70, at 2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Ding & Cai, supra note 93.
101. See id.
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previously held by dispatch workers from legally qualifying as
appropriate for dispatch employment.102
Furthermore, in order to clarify any ambiguity surrounding
the adjustments made to Article 66, on August 7, 2013, the
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued a request for public comments on a draft adjustment of the labor
dispatch section of the 2013 Amendments.103 These Draft Labor
Dispatch Regulations (“Draft Regulations”), while not yet enacted as law, would further restrict the use of dispatch workers. 104 Primarily, the Draft Regulations suggest two distinct
changes to the LCL as amended by the 2013 Amendments:
First, it would require host employers to clearly lay out what
positions within their office qualify as auxiliary positions. 105
This list of auxiliary positions would be reviewable by the host
employer’s labor union or employee representative and publicized to all employees.106 Additionally, the maximum amount of
auxiliary positions would be set at 10% of the combined directhire employees and current dispatched auxiliary workers, not
including any temporary or substitute positions.107 Second, the
Draft Regulations clarify a host employer’s status as equally
liable as the dispatch-employer. 108 Similar to Article 94, this
draft regulation serves to eliminate the ability of host employers to avoid liability for LCL violations committed by contracted dispatch agencies. Although not yet enacted as law, when
viewed as a whole, the Draft Regulations suggest that China is
continuing its legislative push to eliminate reliance on dispatch
employees by greatly limiting their legitimate use.
e. The Persistent Problem of Enforcement
Although labor rights of Chinese workers have increased
dramatically through the use of the Labor Law of 1995, the La102. See id.
103. Elizabeth Cole, Mark Weeks & Yumiko Ohta, China Labor Contract
Law Amendments on Dispatch Employees Come into Effect—Implementation
LAW
(August
27,
2013),
Details
Still
Uncertain,
COVENTUS
http://www.conventuslaw.com/china-labor-contract-law-amendments-ondispatch-employees-come-into-effect-implementation-details-still-uncertain/.
104. Wilson, supra note 6.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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bor Contract Law of 2008, the 2013 Amendments to the Labor
Contract Law, and potentially the 2013 Draft Regulations, a
persistent problem for Chinese laborers is the poor enforcement
of the law.109 As of 2010, three years after the approval of the
LCL, one study found that out of employees interviewed, only
“sixty percent . . . had a contract at the time of their interview;
[and that] 53 percent . . . had contracts before the law went into
effect.” 110 As addressed above, many of these individuals felt
their contracts omitted key provisions that were required by
law.111 Similarly, dispatch workers, who are most affected by
the ineffective execution of the LCL, have even begun to protest
the lack of enforcement of Article 63’s equal-pay-for-equal work
requirement. 112 Despite the fact that many of these workers
perform the same function as direct-hire employees, dispatch
workers receive less than half the compensation.113 Arguably,
the primary impediment to Chinese workers, especially dispatch workers, is lack of access to the rights granted to them
under Chinese law. Therefore, simply amending the current
labor statutes to include further regulations and expanded
“rights” for workers will not solve the problem. Rather, through
the use of an attorney fee-shifting program for LCL violations
and an enhanced notification system of legal rights and remedies, China can give bite to its labor legislation and provide
workers with the rights their nation has promised them.
II. WHAT IS AN ATTORNEY FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE?
The basis of an attorney fee-shifting system is that the loser
in a bout of litigation is required to pay for the winning party’s
attorney fees. 114 The concept is utilized in various fashions
across the world and is rooted in two main principles: 1) that
defeat in litigation justifies the imposition of legal fees on the
losing party, and 2) that the winner in litigation deserves full
109. Liu Xuetan, counsel to the auxiliary workers, has stated, “Although
the law prohibits unequal pay for equal work, when it comes to enforcement,
that’s a very different story.” Cheung, supra note 85.
110. BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 7.
111. Id.
112. See Cheung, supra note 85.
113. Id.
114. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L. REV. 651 (1982).

1162

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:3

compensation, not detracted by attorney fees, to be made fully
whole.115 The policy incentives inherent to the idea of fee shifting concern the extensive financial burden created by litigation. The imposition of attorney fees upon a losing party acts as
a great deterrent to frivolous lawsuits,116 eases the backlog of
cases for the courts, and makes headway toward fully compensating the winning litigant.117
a. The Development of Attorney Fee Shifting in America
Unlike a majority of states, the United States legal system
has relied primarily on a system of up-front payment where
each party is responsible for their own litigation costs regardless of the outcome.118 This American rule seems to have grown
not out of policy incentives but rather through a combination of
early distrust of the legal profession and legislative refusal to
address the issue.119 Scholars have argued that a great disdain
for attorneys, who were seen as an “unnecessary luxury,” developed within colonial America and continued into the early
United States.120 This level of distrust and hostility aimed at
the legal profession made the concept of court-ordered attorney
fees an unpopular subject. 121 Furthermore, after the Revolutionary War, as American courts began to experiment with the
concept of attorney fee shifting, the U.S. Supreme Court remained persistently hostile to acceptance of such a system. In
both Arcambel v. Wiseman and Day v. Wood-worth, some of the
earliest Supreme Court cases where attorney fee shifting was
raised, the Court refused to legitimize the practice.122 Rather,
the Court emphasized the “general practice” of American juris115. David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 589 (2005).
116. See Rowe, supra note 114.
117. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 637-38 (1974).
118. See Root, supra note 115, at 585.
119. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 117, at 640.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796); Day v. Wood-worth, 54
U.S. 363 (1851) (identifying the early practice of the United States Supreme
Court to refuse requests for attorney fees to even a successful litigant).
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prudence to deny requests for attorney fees and passed the
burden of such determinations to the legislature.123
However, as American jurisprudence evolved, the strict adherence to the American rule waivered, opening up six main
categories of exceptions to the ban on attorney fee shifting.124
Generally, American courts have found exceptions to the ban
on attorney fee shifting in cases involving 1) contracts, 2) bad
faith, 3) the common fund doctrine, 4) the substantial benefit
doctrine, 5) contempt, and 6) fee-shifting statutes.125
One specific fee-shifting statute that has become extremely
prevalent in the United States is the Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Award Act of 1976. 126 Under the Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Award Act, otherwise known as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a “court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs.” 127 The justification for this divergence from the traditional American system is based on policy concerns prioritizing
the assurance of adequate “access to the judicial process for
persons with civil rights grievances.”128 In an effort to expand
recourse to the law for all citizens who have suffered a violation
of their civil rights, this exception to the American rule encourages meritorious lawsuits by eliminating both the expense of
legal counsel and the chilling effect of attorney fees among potential plaintiffs.129
b. How Attorney Fee Shifting Works under 42 U.S.C. § 1988:
The “Prevailing Party”
The first issue to address in determining appropriate attorney fees is who can actually demand such costs. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1988, reasonable attorney fees are awarded to the
“prevailing party” of civil rights litigation. This category explic-

123. See Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306; see also Court Awarded Attorney Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 117, at 640.
124. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 117, at 640.
125. See id.
126. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000).
127. Id.
128. Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1233 (5th Cir. 1987).
129. See Kaimowitz v. Howard, 547 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1993).
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itly excludes the United States but allows plaintiffs, and in
some cases defendants, to retain reasonable attorney fees when
they succeed in litigation. Unless the parties have explicitly
agreed to an alternate payment system, in cases where a settlement is reached, courts have ruled that a plaintiff is automatically deemed the prevailing party.130 However, prevailing
defendants in civil rights actions are not always guaranteed
attorney fees, even if they prevail in an action brought against
them.131 Unlike plaintiff’s attorneys, who are entitled to attorney fees unless the unique circumstances of the case would
render such fees unjust,132 defendants are entitled to attorney
fees only where the plaintiff’s underlying claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.133
c. Reasonable Attorney Fees
In regards to the calculation of “reasonable” attorney fees,
great discretion is granted to the district court in its determination of fees, which is only subject to review for abuse of judicial discretion.134 Judges may award whatever reasonable fees
they deem necessary, but are free to limit compensation or
grant it sparingly if they find the fee claims exorbitant or the
time allegedly devoted to the litigation unreasonably high.135 A
reasonable fee is described as one “sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious
civil rights case,”136 but not one that simply acts as a “form of
economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys.” 137

130. See Davis v. Jackson, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(“Court[s] [must] resist the . . . temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action
must have been unreasonable or without foundation.”) (citation omitted);
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000).
131. See Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 1995).
132. United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991).
133. Id.
134. Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996); see Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1980).
135. Gagne, 448 U.S. at 129.
136. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010).
137. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 565 (1986).
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Currently, the Supreme Court uses the two-step lodestar 138
method in calculating attorney fees.139 First, the court will multiply the reported hours an attorney has worked by the courtdetermined hourly rate to generate the “lodestar amount.” Second, the court will adjust the lodestar amount based on any
special circumstances of the case at bar.140 The determination
of a reasonable hourly rate is often based on the prevailing
market rate for an attorney of similar skill and experience
within the relevant legal community, which is generally the
forum in which the court sits.141 However, the Supreme Court
has also authorized additional factors to consider in the determination of a reasonable hourly rate.142 The twelve factors that
were developed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.
have been approved by both Congress and the Supreme Court
and are as follows:
(1) the time and labor required to litigate the suit; (2)
the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented by
the lawsuit; (3) the skill required [to] properly . . . perform the legal service; (4) the preclusion of other employment opportunities for the attorney due to the attorney’s acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for
such services; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy involved and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the attorney’s profes-

138. Lodestar Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/lodestar (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). A lodestar is defined as “something or someone that leads or guides a person or group of people.” The two-prong lodestar analysis was first utilized by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34
(1983).
139. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 551.
140. Brooks Magratten, Robert D. Phillips Jr., Thomas Connolly, Renee
Feldman & Isaac Mamaysky, Trial Practice: Calculating Attorney Fee
Awards,
GPSOLO,
Mar.
2010,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home
/gp_solo_magazine_index/magratten_phillips_connolly_feldman_mamaysky.h
tml.
141. See id.; see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 (1984).
142. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
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sional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases.143
As to the second prong of the lodestar calculation, in 2010,
the Supreme Court greatly reduced the possibility for adjustments to the reasonable fee, permitting such post-lodestar
changes only in “extraordinary circumstances.”144 In Perdue v.
Kenny, the Court held that while the lodestar method was
“never intended to be conclusive in all circumstances . . . there
[remains] a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is reasonable.”145 This presumption is almost universally upheld in
actions arguing for a reduction of the lodestar amounts.146 Similarly, upward adjustments occur rarely and only when payment of fees has been exceptionally delayed or where the attorney’s work has been outstanding in the face of expensive and
protracted litigation.147 Therefore, it is the twelve Johnson factors that weigh most heavily in the final determination of reasonable attorney fees.148

143. See Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1075 (4th Cir. 1986); Trimper v. City of
Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 73 (1995); see also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–20 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve factors are commonly
referred to as the Johnson factors due to their development in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc. Hill, 790 F.2d at 1077. Although in the Perdue
dictum, the Supreme Court criticized the use of the Johnson factors, the
Court ruled specifically on the strong presumption of reasonableness developed in determining the initial lodestar reasonable rate and “did not expressly state that a court should not use the Johnson factors to determine [this
initial] lodestar figure.” Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, No. 4:11CV00043,
2013 WL 4520023, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2013). Furthermore, after Perdue, federal courts have continued to utilize the Johnson factors in developing an initial reasonable fee under the lodestar method. See, e.g., id.; Jackson
v. Estelle’s Place, LLC, 391 F. App’x. 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2010); McClain v.
Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2011); Trustees of Local
531 Pension Fund v. Flexwrap Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590–91 (E.D.N.Y.
2011).
144. Lyle Denniston, Analysis: The Lodestar as Gold Standard,
(Apr.
21,
2010,
10:59
AM),
SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/analysis-the-lodestar-as-gold-standard/.
145. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553–54 (2010).
146. See Magratten et al., supra note 140.
147. See id.
148. See Denniston, supra note 144.
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d. Problems with the Current Attorney Fee-Shifting Rule
Although providing legal recourse to the poor and most vulnerable populations is a justifiable pursuit, the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Award Act of 1976 has led to growing problems for
municipalities and their taxpayers within the United States.149
The most basic of these issues is the granting of huge attorney
fees in conjunction with modest jury awards to plaintiffs.150 Litigation is a costly endeavor and can often drag on for years at a
time.151 Attorney fees for civil rights cases vary, but often range
from US$200 to US$500 per hour.152 These high hourly rates,
combined with the heavy presumption against post-lodestar
adjustments, make the initiation and protraction of litigation
more appealing than securing justice for one’s client. Dragging
litigation on for years with extensive statistical analysis, expert
research, broad discovery, and numerous attorneys153 assigned
to a case can lead to vastly disproportionate awards of attorney
fees when compared to plaintiff awards.154 Additionally, plaintiff’s attorneys are also often awarded the same “reasonable
fees” in cases where the parties reach an agreeable settle-

149. See Katherine Macfarlane, In Shira Scheindlin’s Courtroom, Stop-andFrisk Lawyers Are the Only Winners, NEW YORK OBSERVER (Nov. 13, 2013,
7:00 AM), http://observer.com/2013/11/stop-and-frisk-lawyers/.
150. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986); see also Max
McCann, Police Misconduct Litigation: Keeping an Open Mind,
OVERLAWYERED (Sep. 23, 2013), http://overlawyered.com/police-abuselitigation-incentives-keeping-open-mind/.
151. See Pacific Research Institute, Study Claims U.S. ‘Tort Tax’ Tops
J.
(Mar.
3,
2007),
$9,800
Per
Family,
INS.
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2007/03/27/78137.htm. The
study notes that America’s legal system imposes an economic cost of more
than US$865 billion every year and leads to extensive defensive costs made
to limit potential legal liability. Id.
152. See, e.g., Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dept., 468 F. Supp. 2d 333, 339 (D.
Conn. 2006); Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1398–99 (11th Cir.
1996); Winston v. O’Brien, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
153. See Tucker v. City of New York, 704 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
154. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 149 (focusing on Daniels v. City of
New York, where, after a settlement between the parties, plaintiffs’ counsels
were awarded over US$3.5 million in fees and costs while the ten named
plaintiffs received only US$167,000).
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ment, 155 which further encourages amassing clientele rather
than diligent lawyering. The combination of high hourly rates,
less merit-based awards, and a relaxed standard of “prevailing
parties” for plaintiffs, has created a genuine market of civil
rights litigation.156 However, although problems with fee shifting must be acknowledged, the practice has ultimately proved a
crucial tool in providing indigent claimants access to legal remedy for violations of their civil rights.157
III. APPLICATION TO CHINESE LABOR LAW
a. Fee Shifting
Despite the problems that the United States has faced in its
use of fee-shifting statutes, it is exactly this type of litigation
scheme that Chinese workers desperately need to gain access
to their employment rights.158 The current crisis facing Chinese
laborers, specifically dispatch laborers, is not a lack of statutory authority mandating specific employment practices, but rather a complete lack of knowledge and government enforcement of these rights. However, the implementation of an attorney-fee shifting program, similar to the United States’ Civil
Rights Attorney Fee Act of 1976, can create an appealing market for employment rights cases in China that will incentivize
attorneys to actively seek out laborers in need of assistance.
Through the use of attorney fees as a supplementary financial
incentive, China can modify ordinary market conditions surrounding LCL violation litigation and make it profitable to

155. See Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 451 (9th Cir.
2010); FED. R. CIV. P. 68; Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1985) (noting
that in the context of Section 1983 civil rights actions, settlement offers made
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 include attorney fees within
its definition of costs).
156. “In estimating the significance of any rise in civil suits against police
officers, it’s worth keeping in mind that this is not just the pursuit of social
justice. It’s an industry.” See McCann, supra note 150.
157. See Md. Access to Justice Comm’n, Fee-Shifting to Promote the Public
Interest in Maryland, 42 U. BALT. L.F. 38, 47–50 (2011).
158. See id. The Maryland Access to Justice Commission argues that the
use of attorney fee shifting within the realm of U.S. civil rights cases has
generated a beneficial market shaped around enhanced financial incentives
for attorneys. Id.
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connect individuals whose rights have been violated with
groups who can adequately fight for their compensation.159
China has already successfully tested the use of attorney fee
shifting in other legal forums.160 In 1993, China began allowing
prevailing parties under the Law Against Unfair Competition
to seek out reasonable expenses associated with the investigation and litigation of their claims.161 Similarly, in 2002, China’s
Supreme People’s Court specifically acknowledged the use of
attorney fee shifting in cases of trademark infringement and
other actions of copyright litigation.162 Additionally, despite a
lack of statutory authorization, some Chinese courts have even
implemented a fee-shifting approach on an ad hoc basis for successful plaintiffs in consumer and personal injury cases.163 Fee
shifting in these areas can arguably suggest a rising dissatisfaction with the current payment system, in which each party
pays their own attorney fees and many successful plaintiffs
lose large portions of their awards to attorney commissions.
Therefore implementation of this type of fee-shifting system
would not be completely unprecedented, and would likely be
well received by both laborers and plaintiff counsels.
Currently, Chinese labor attorneys have few incentives to
represent poor workers in employment rights cases. Migrant
workers and dispatch workers on average earn only 1290 RMB
per year, while the average commission for attorneys can range
from 500 to 5000 RMB.164 This enormous investment in legal
counsel greatly discourages employees from bringing small
claims in the first place, and the small awards for unpaid wages or overtime rarely cover the attorney commissions.165 For the
claims pursued, cultural biases often lead Chinese law firms to
avoid representing migrant workers, in particular, because
they fear successful claimants will refuse to share any damage

159. Id. at 38–39.
160. See Donald C. Clarke, The Private Attorney-General in China: Potential
and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 241, 253 (2009).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Liang, supra note 9.
165. See id.
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award granted.166 Therefore, due to the small payout and possibility of lack of payment, Chinese law firms lack the financial
incentive to seek out and diligently assist workers litigate LCL
claims.167
However, through the use of a modified attorney fee-shifting
program, China can incentivize attorneys to find and accept
employee rights cases, as well as litigate them to the best of
their abilities. By adopting the American system of “reasonable
hourly rates,” utilizing the twelve Johnson factors to determine
reasonableness, and adopting the relaxed standard of “prevailing party,” the financial incentive to represent employee rights
claims would dramatically increase.168 Similar to the plaintiff’s
attorneys in civil rights cases throughout the United States,
the huge potential payout for attorneys would make litigating
even minor employment rights claims extremely appealing.169
Therefore, employees who previously lacked the funds necessary to obtain legal counsel would have access at no personal
cost.
However, the vast benefits of attorney fee shifting should not
overshadow the problem of excessive attorney fees in the face of
nominal litigant awards. As addressed in Part II(d), the combination of high hourly rates, less merit-based enhancements or
reductions, and a relaxed prevailing party standard has led to
cases with attorney fees completely disproportionate from the
plaintiff’s actual award.170 To remedy this issue, China must
maintain the reasonableness requirements embodied in the
Johnson factors, implement statutorily imposed maximum and
minimum hourly rates, and place a heavier emphasis on meritbased enhancements and reductions. The use of the Johnson
166. See Yin Lily Zheng, Note, It’s Not What Is on Paper, but What Is in
Practice: China’s New Labor Contract Law and the Enforcement Problem, 8
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 595, 606 (2009).
167. See id.
168. E.g., Macfarlane, supra note 149. In the context of American civil
rights cases, Macfarlane details the significant financial incentive created for
attorneys to litigate cases when attorney fee shifting, reasonable hourly
rates, the twelve Johnson factors, and the relaxed standard of prevailing party have been implemented.
169. See McCann, supra note 150 (establishing the significant financial incentives for civil rights attorneys to bring “marginal, not just high-value” cases to court).
170. See Riverside, 477 U.S. at 561; see McCann, supra note 150.
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factors, when combined with set maximum and minimum reasonable rates, will greatly temper the degree of attorney-fee
liability employers may face in employment rights cases, but
the emphasis on merit-based enhancements will balance this
slight diminished incentive with a powerful motivation to provide high quality legal representation.
Local government organizations are the best entities to set
the appropriate range of attorney fees in determining maximum and minimum hourly rates. 171 Local governments can
best balance the strong nationwide desire to provide access to
legal remedy for employees with their own liability as an employer, along with the liability of private organizations in their
locale. This balance of policy incentives will lead to an equitable range of reasonable rates and will avoid the burdensome
expenses seen in some civil rights cases in the United States.172
Additionally, the dramatic limitations on American postlodestar adjustments should not be implemented in China’s attorney fee-shifting legislation. With the limits on reasonable
attorney fees in place, lawyers will still hold a strong financial
incentive to accept and litigate employment rights cases, but
lack an incentive to provide effective and efficient lawyering.

171. China is divided into twenty-two provinces, five “autonomous” regions,
and four municipalities that are directly controlled by the Chinese central
government. The provincial governments, the people’s governments of the
autonomous regions, and the municipal governments under the Central Government, which exercise authority over these geographic sectors of China, are
responsible for the implementation of local laws and regulations. China’s Political
System:
The
Local
Administrative
System,
CHINA.ORG,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm (last visited Apr. 20,
2014). It is this level of government that would be best suited to address necessary limitations on judicial discretion in determining appropriate attorney
fees.
172. See, e.g., David D. Dudley & Frances Reynolds Colbert, Determining
Reasonable Attorney Fees, 85 WIS. LAW. 10 (2012), available at
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?
Volume=85&Issue=10&ArticleID=10217. In response to cases involving violations of consumer protection laws in which attorney fees far exceeded the
awarded compensatory damages, Wisconsin enacted statute 814.045, which
limits reasonable attorney fees to a maximum of three times the amount of
compensatory damages awarded. This set limit is overcome only in rare circumstances where the court determines greater amounts are reasonable. Id.
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Since a majority of cases in all actions result in settlement,173
any system that refuses to award attorney fees in settled cases
will eliminate the incentive for attorneys to work. Therefore, a
better approach toward increasing the quality of advocacy provided to Chinese laborers is to give courts greater discretion in
determining both reductions and enhancements to the final
lodestar award. Rather than adopt the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Perdue,174 China should craft local legislation that can incentivize good lawyering without leading to
ridiculous discrepancies between plaintiff awards and attorney
fees. The appropriate factors to determine post-lodestar adjustments, as well as the limitations on such adjustments, are
again best suited for local Chinese governing bodies who can
properly balance the need for enforcement in employee rights
claims with the resulting economic and municipal liability concerns associated with such reforms. Furthermore, these organizations are best suited to quickly realize if the increased judicial discretion in awarding post-lodestar fee enhancements
needs further limitation to achieve its purpose of creating a financial incentive for attorneys, without granting excessive and
undeserved fee awards.
b. Enhanced Notification
The modified fee-shifting system proposed above will provide
a necessary tool for Chinese laborers to access their employment rights under the Labor Contract Law of 2008 and the
subsequent amendments. However, despite the strong financial
motivation this new market of LCL claims will provide for attorneys, the system will not succeed without employees actually understanding their labor and employment rights.
A majority of Chinese workers learn of their employment
rights through conventional media sources, such as television
or the Internet. However, older, poorer, and less educated
workers have extremely limited access to these resources. 175
The resulting effect is that the most vulnerable populations of
173. See Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than Going to
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at C1 (addressing the appeal of settlement
and estimating that 80–92% of cases never actually reach the trial phase of
litigation).
174. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 556 (2010).
175. BECKER & ELFSTROM, supra note 77, at 16.
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workers, migrant and dispatch laborers, are the least likely to
obtain reliable information concerning their rights as workers.176 Therefore, to compliment the fee-shifting model and secure knowledge of employment rights, additional regulations
mandating notification of LCL rights in the workplace must be
implemented. As seen in many federal and state statutes in the
United States, poster notifications are used to ensure workers
obtain knowledge of some of their most basic rights.177 For example, under 29 C.F.R. § 1903.2, employers in the United
States are required to display posters developed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 178 The posters are
required to be placed in “a conspicuous place where workers
can see it” and specifically inform workers of their rights under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 179 Similarly, under
New York Labor Law § 661, New York State employers are required to post displays informing workers of the current New
York State minimum wage, overtime rates, and other wage requirements in multiple languages.180
China should adopt a similar poster-requirement system that
notifies workers of basic, fundamental employment rights, such
as the requirements of fixed and open-ended contracts, overtime pay, and severance pay. The poster requirement must
mandate placement in a conspicuous location where it can easily be seen by workers and should be written in both Simplified
and Traditional Chinese characters181 to ensure that a majority
of workers have notice of their employment rights. While em176. See id. at 8.
177. See, e.g., Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small BusiDEP’T
OF
LABOR,
nesses
and
Other
Employers,
U.S.
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster/matrix.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2014).
178. OSHA’s Workplace Poster: Job Safety and Health: It’s the Law,
SAFETY
&
HEALTH
ADMIN.
(2013),
OCCUPATIONAL
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/poster.html.
179. Id.
180. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 661 (McKinney 2010).
181. Simplified
Chinese
vs
Traditional
Chinese,
ELANEX,
http://www.elanex.com/EN/languages_chinese.aspx (last visited Apr. 20,
2014) (noting that traditional written Chinese holds greater popularity in
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and among many Chinese peoples spread throughout
the world, while simplified Chinese is more popular throughout Mainland
China and Singapore).
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ployers may not actively comply with these regulations, as seen
with those regulations currently in place, the new market for
labor attorneys will have lawyers actively seeking out these
easily identifiable and provable violations of the LCL.
CONCLUSION
Despite the implementation of the Labor Law of 1995, the
Labor Contract Law of 2008, and the 2013 Amendments to the
Labor Contract Law, Chinese workers still lack adequate access to their employment rights. While these regulations seem
to reflect a nationwide policy in favor of employee rights, a solution to the enforcement problem will not be found in procuring more restrictive employment regulations. Rather, through
the use of a modified attorney fee-shifting system and a poster
notification requirement, China can provide workers with the
means to access these statutory rights. By using the American
fee-shifting system in civil rights cases as a model, including
adjustments to limit unreasonable costs, China can incentivize
attorneys to seek out employee-rights cases and provide legal
representation at no charge. Furthermore, by utilizing a poster
notification system of employment rights, China can combat
the confusion among workers concerning their statutory rights
and fuel the employee rights litigation market. With these minor legislative adjustments, China can complement its already
progressive employment regulations with the means for workers to access their legal rights.
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“TWO HOUSEHOLDS, BOTH ALIKE IN
DIGNITY”: THE INTERNATIONAL FEUD
BETWEEN ADMIRALTY AND
BANKRUPTCY
Two households, both alike in dignity,
In fair Verona, where we lay our scene,
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean.
From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
A pair of star-cross’d lovers take their life;
Whose misadventured piteous overthrows
Do with their death bury their parents’ strife.
The fearful passage of their death-mark’d love,
And the continuance of their parents’ rage,
Which, but their children’s end, nought could remove,
Is now the two hours’ traffic of our stage;
The which if you with patient ears attend,
What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.1

INTRODUCTION

I

n 2012, the Japanese shipping firm Sanko Steamship Co.
(“Sanko”) unilaterally refused to make lease payments on
certain of its commercial shipping vessels.2 After Sanko
stopped making its payments, multiple creditors, including the
Liberian navigation firm Evridiki Navigation, Inc. (“Evridiki”),
proceeded quasi in rem3 against the M/V Sanko Mineral (“the
Mineral”) and attached the vessel while it was in port at Baltimore, Maryland.4 Sanko refused to post a bond, which would
have released the Mineral, out of concern that such action
would affect its private resolution process with its chief creditors.5 The vessel, however, still contained cargo for which
Sanko’s customers had already paid.6 Several of these customers, some incorporated abroad and others in the United States,
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, prologue.
2. Evridiki Navigation, Inc. v. Sanko S.S. Co., 880 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668
(D. Md. 2012).
3. See discussion infra Part I.A.
4. Evridiki, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
5. In furtherance of its efforts to avoid a formal bankruptcy filing, Sanko
had started a private resolution process with its chief creditors. Id. at 669.
6. Id. at 668.

